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Abstract

New innovations in information management and communication technologies have
produced technological assemblages which have radically altered the way people socialize and
interact with the world. The most significant and ubiquitous of these technologies is what is
colloquially referred to as ‘machine learning.’ Like most, if not all, technologies, machine
learning models are neither wholly good nor bad. Their functional ethics are largely determined
by the context in which they are employed. However, their ubiquity demands that we develop a
heightened social consciousness of the way machine learning simultaneous constrains,
manipulates and democratizes social processes. In order to develop better social understanding of
technologies that incorporate machine learning, we must clarify how and why corporate
engineers and executives scale and implement machine learning into their respective applications
and services. Unfortunately, high-level calculus and computer science obscure this situation and
make formulating a critical space for humanist theorists and Science and Technology
policymakers an exhaustive discursive endeavor. The absence of a well understood discourse on
the manner in which machine-learning algorithms are implemented represents a kind of sociotechnical opacity, which obscures technological processes for contextualized corporate, design
and user-motivated ethics. In order to address this problem, I propose to analyze the primary
machine-learning algorithm models which organize and rank the information presented on social
media newsfeed. An analysis that clarifies the function of machine learning algorithms can
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promote academic research and provide the impetus for Science and Technology policy
incentives. Finally, this sort of analysis suggests the need for a regulatory agency for machine
learning algorithms prior to their implementation into public production site environments (i.e.
social media)

iv

Introduction

In the last decade and a half social networking technology has risen to global
prominence. Applications and websites that enable users to create and share content as a means
of social networking have created a new means of communication, but most importantly a new
digital space in which communication and ethics can be generated and managed. Already there
are calls for Facebook Inc. to develop machine learning models to distinguish between political
fact and lie in digital journalism. Done without adequate ethical consideration, this could result
in unforeseen ethical and social implications. This is but one of many emerging discursive issues
surrounding machine-learning in social media. One of the profoundly wonderful characteristics
of the modern era is its ability to quickly build new technologies to grapple with modern issues
of information management overload and sustainability. But a key disadvantage of such an
exponential rate of technological innovation is that the humanist theories which should be
associated with their ethical implementation and use lag behind developmentally. This limits
public and academic discourse and prevents rhetoric and Science and Technology scholars from
properly evaluating the communicative ethics of new digital technologies. A key meta-physical
characteristic of present technological usage is reductionism, described by philosophers as the
manner in which objects are stripped of their natural connections so that new, implicit, social and
technical connections emerge in their place. Instrumentalization theory, first postulated by
Andrew Feenberg in ‘A Critical Theory of Technology’ (1991), provides a dual-level (primary
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and secondary) analytical heuristic to probe the implications of social processes that are sociotechnically reduced in a digital space which is algorithmically designed, determined and
managed. Feenberg’s instrumentalization theory stresses the notion that, like any tool,
technology embodies the ethics and ontological nature of the individuals who design and create
them. As such, his theory exposes a deep exigency for a synthesized rationality towards the
democratic and ethical implementation and critique of new technological systems. The
emergence of ubiquitous social media which reduce social interactions provides a tangible space
to use Feenberg’s dual level (primary, secondary) instrumentalization theory to develop a
humanist approach to technological critique and design.
This first section of this paper examines the manner in which instrumentalization theory
operates as a critical theory of technology and offers a useful analytical heuristic for examining
the ethics of machine learning algorithms. Andrew Feenberg, and his theoretical forefathers such
as Herbert Marcuse, Martin Heidegger and Jurgen Habermas, provide a theoretical space in
which to discuss issues of technological ethics, purpose and being. A grounding in critical theory
is necessary in order to understand instrumentalization theory and the applicability of its duallevel process to a complex technology such as machine learning. Furthermore, understanding the
theories which define technological ethics is also essential in order to apply them to specific
machine learning processes.
Section 2 focuses on issues related to the ethics of machine learning, more specifically on
the perceived functional ethics of the technology as they exist in their leveraging of multiple
public services on Facebook and other select case studies, such as Virginia Eubanks examination
of the social repercussions of automated decision-making technologies on low-income
households across the United States, Obermeyer et. al research detailing the algorithmic targeting
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and marginalization of Black insurance-seekers in the United Kingdom . The section also
discusses the manner in which our understanding of this technical ethic is obscured by the
prominence of socio-technical opacity. Socio-technical opacity, as explained by machine
learning researchers and engineers from the public and private sectors, arises out of public lack
of understanding of technical processes, adherence to experts and technical hurdles which
prevent even machine learning engineers from understanding exactly how ML decisions occur.
The primary effect of socio-technical opacity in machine learning is that it serves to obfuscate
the importation of algorithmic bias from machine learning engineers and the context and nature
of the available data which the algorithm can utilize. It is essential to firmly establish the
functional ethics of machine learning, prior to the formation of a solution to the harmful aspects
of their public implementation.
The third section of the paper spends time overlaying Feenberg’s instrumentalization
theory and its primary and secondary analytical levels with specific machine learning algorithm
models utilized by Facebook Inc. to leverage important public applications and services. The
analysis aims to provide a means of establishing the general technical code of Facebook’s
utilization of machine learning in public production sites, and the manner in which this technical
code presents an exigency for public policy related to the responsible and considerate
implementation of machine learning models in society. The paper concludes with a discussion of
the specific socio-technical ethics that American science and technology policy should consider
in order to ensure that machine learning algorithm models that are implemented by multinational tech-corporations are done so in a way that is codified, regulated and more in line with
humanist concerns of wellbeing and dignity, over those of technical expediency and control.
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Research Question: How can instrumentalization theory provide a theoretical basis for the
realization of a heightened social-technical consciousness of the beneficial and reductive
characteristics of machine learning models on Facebook’s Newsfeed, and what are the
implications of the need of such a realization for Science and Technology Policy?
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Section 1: Instrumentalization Theory as an Analytical Heuristic

Andrew Feenberg is deeply engrained within Critical Theory’s critique on the philosophy
of technology. In Critical Theory of Technology, Feenberg lays out the various figures from the
Frankfurt School who influenced his outlook on the state of technological critique today (namely
Martin Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology, Adorno & Horkheimer’s Dialectic of
Enlightenment, Marcuse’s 1-Dimensional Man, and Habermas’s Towards a Rational Society).
The critique of technology is a key feature of Critical Theory dating back to its founders Adorno
and Horkheimer’s disparaging notion that any form of technical development was “a substrate of
domination” (6). Over time many rhetorical and philosophical luminaries have added their
perspectives to the lexicon, but none more prolific or integral to present understandings of
technology as Herbert Marcuse and Jurgen Habermas. Constructivism and Marcuse’s
reductionist theory of technology posited that technology embodied a specific cultural incentive
for the alteration and domination of nature. For Marcuse technology was not a single device, or
technic as he would say, but “was a social process in which technics proper (that is, the technical
apparatus of industry, transportation, communication) is but a partial factor…[humans] are
themselves an integral part and factor of technology, not only as the men who invent or attend to
machinery but also as the social groups which direct its application and utilization” (Marcuse
65). As such, it operates as a broad ranging criticism of technology’s allegiance to capitalist
industry and culture as the main generator of its’ authoritarian and reductive characteristics.

5

Martin Heidegger’s substantivist critique of modernity is also a key influence behind Feenberg’s
theory of instrumentalization. Heidegger, like Marcuse, was skeptical of technology and the
implications of technological usage. Unlike Marcuse however, Heidegger believed that
technology was not only a phenomenon of power but also that of enframement. In Heidegger’s
view what is most important about technology was not its inherent technical utility but its
essence. Heidegger uses the term poises, or ‘revealing’, to describe the process by which
technology presents new social assemblages or truths. Instead of attempting to gauge a
technology’s technical application from its real-world applications, it was more important to
achieve a revealing of the essence of technology’s being. Heidegger calls this essence of
technology gestell, or enframing. “Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon
which sets upon man i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as
standing reserve” (Heidegger 10). When we view technology as enframing, we come to
understand that technology is a force by which things are made open, and ultimately by which
we come to understand and make sense of the world around us.
“Revealing that holds sway through modern technology […] is […] a challenging […]
which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and
stored” (Heidegger, 6). Unlike the revealing of early rudimentary technologies, such as the
fishing rod or spade, modern technology does not reveal in the same manner as poiesis. The
primary objective difference between older forms of technology versus those presently is that our
present technology is based on modern physics as an exact science. On an essential level,
however, the difference in the revealing that occurs in modern technological usage challenges the
natural world to supply it with energy which can be stored for later retrieval and use.
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As modern technology reveals nature is reduced to a standing reserve of potential energy
and material for human consumption. However, as the process of revealing is never ending,
according to Heidegger, the challenging put forth to nature by contemporary revealing is also put
forward unto us. We are challenged as users of technology to envision nature as an untapped
resource, awaiting conversion into standing reserve. By virtue of this technologically dominated
relationship between humanity and nature, we too are situated as standing reserve in society.
Heidegger notes that modern technology challenges us to view nature as an object of research to
reveal, or simply something to order into a standing reserve, which occurs through enframing.
Heidegger’s concept of enframing is an integral ontological process that Feenberg incorporates
into his instrumentalization theory. When we are engaged in an enframed relationship with
technology and reality, we are also engaging in what Heidegger defines as a process of
disclosure. “According to Heidegger, our nature as human beings is to be world disclosers. This
means that we open, by means of our equipment and coordinated practices, coherent, distinct
contexts or worlds in which we perceive, act, and think” (White and Searle, 131). In other words,
new forms of technology disclose new horizons of thinking, new assemblages for interacting
with the world, each other and the self. If the world disclosed to us through machine learning
algorithms on social media is an enframed world, what elements of our natural socialization
processes are currently being converted into standing reserve? Andrew Feenberg’s
instrumentalization theory provides a framework in which to examine how ubiquitous digital
technologies, such as machine learning algorithms, disclose, reveal and enframe human beings
into a new relationship with digital technology.
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The Dual Ethics of Technology
As Feenberg writes, “the debate between Marcuse and Habermas over technology
marked a significant turning point in the history of the Frankfurt School. After the 1960’s
Habermas’s influence grew as Marcuse’s declined and Critical Theory adopted a far less utopian
stance” (Feenberg 45). It is here that Habermas, a late-coming philosophical member of
Marcuse’s same Frankfurt School, provides Critical Theory with a counterpoint to constructivist
thought, the view that technology holds an inherently reductionist or enframing characteristic. In
Habermas’s view, the technical control of nature is a genuine species-wide interest for humans,
an interest with no ties to any singular cultural or economic feature. When Feenberg views the
state of the debate he observes that “while much of Habermas’s argument remains persuasive,
his defense of modernity now seems to concede far too much to claims of autonomous
technology” (Feenberg 45). In Habermasian communicative rationality theory, technology
operates not as an artificial technic subject to the perpetuation of ideological control, as Marcuse
would attest, but rather an ideology. According to Habermas, through a reduction of questions of
what a good, well-lived life is to technical concerns for experts, contemporary elites eliminate
the need for a public democratic discourse of values, thereby depoliticizing them. In this view,
technology only operates as a veil to mask the value-laden nature of government decision
making (Habermas 83).
Marcuse, Heidegger, Habermas and Marx all contributed to Feenberg’s understanding
and valuing of positivistic and socially constraining features of technology. Feenberg defines a
good society as one which “enlarges the personal freedom of its members while enabling them to
participate effectively in a widening range of public activities. At the highest level, public life
involves choices about what it means to be human. Today these choices are increasingly
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mediated by technical decisions” (“Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited” 3).
As such, the design of technology is an ontological decision fraught with political consequences.
Traditional accounts of technology, determinist and instrumentalist, highlight efficiency as the
principle of selection which determines a successful or failed technology. In the formation of his
instrumentalization theory, Feenberg argues that the intervention of interests and subjective
ideologies into technological design does not reduce efficiency but rather biases its’ achievement
according to a broader social program, which he refers to as a ‘technical code’. According to
Feenberg, the technical code is the rule in which technologies are realized in a social context
with biases reflecting the unequal distribution of social power. Feenberg postulated
instrumentalization theory as a means of uniting the insights of substantivist understandings of
technology in which technology reduces and enframes natural processes and elements into raw
materials for extraction, and the constructivism of contemporary historians and sociologists who
argued that technology is nothing more than extension of natural human processes. Feenberg
unites the pessimistic distrust of technology’s potential from the philosophy of technology,
courtesy of Heidegger and Marcuse, and Habermas’s accommodating and forgiving
interpretation of technological usage in his theory. Instrumentalization theory states that
technology must be analyzed at two levels, the level of our original functional relation to reality
(Primary) and the level of implementation and design (Secondary). Both the primary and
secondary levels of instrumentalization theory contain contingent elements and ontological
operations which help distinguish between both analytical spaces. Most importantly,
instrumentalization theory makes explicit the dual nature of technological processes in its’
deconstruction of the manner in which technology simultaneously constrains material social
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processes, while also providing access to expedited and efficient digital applications leveraged
by new technologies.
Andrew Feenberg’s instrumentalization theory is a meta-theory, as it combines
Heideggerian, Marcusian and Habermasian social critiques on the philosophy of technology, in
addition to insights from case studies related to Science and Technology Studies. At its core,
however, instrumentalization theory provides a way to understand how socially dominant values
are embedded in technological artifacts following their creation and use. Feenberg refers to the
relationship of the social and technical requirements within an arrangement of technical objects
as technical code. “A technical code is the realization of an interest or ideology in a technically
coherent solution to a problem. Although some technical codes are formulated explicitly by
technologists themselves, I am seeking a more general analytic tool that can be applied even in
the absence of such formulations” (Feenberg, 52). The technical code, according to Feenberg,
determines the manner in which technology enframes and discloses new technical relationships
and understandings of reality to the human subject. In other words, the technical code constitutes
a new way of interacting and engaging with the world, whether implicitly or explicitly, through
technology.
It is the technical code which dictates the behavior and conceptualization of technological
processes. It is a product of technological essence and the interaction between human subjects
and technical object. It is the final product of the instrumentalization process as a whole. The
instrumentalization process occurs on two levels, which Feenberg refers to as primary and
secondary. Both levels of instrumentalization contains multiple processes which work to support
the analysis of particular technological arrangements. Primary instrumentalization consists of the
processes of decontextualization and reduction, described by Heidegger through his revealing
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and standing reserve respectively and Marcuse’s reductionism. Feenberg aptly refers to this
decontextualization-reduction effect described in primary instrumentalization as ‘de-worlding’,
while the mediation of ethical and aesthetic designs and the recontextualization of technical
subjects and objects are generalized as ‘disclosing’. Secondary instrumentalization observes the
mediation of ethics and recontextualization of technical objects, as inspired by Marcuse’
dialectics. This critical theory on the philosophy of technology reads as having potential
analytical applications when applied to present day technologies, namely social media.

Primary Instrumentalization
In primary instrumentalization technological functions are decontextualized and
reduced from everyday life. Later the user is positioned to relate to them. The
decontextualization and reduction processes of the primary level all occur under a distancing
effect, where the function and the subject are reduced for maximum manipulation and control by
those who design the technology. When examined through the lens of primary
instrumentalization theory, humans are continuously decontextualized through computer usage.
This process is more easily grasped when viewed and understood as a version of Heidegger’s
revealing. “The computer simplifies a full-blown person into a ‘user’ in order to incorporate him
or her into the network. Users are decontextualized in the sense that they are stripped of body
and community in front of the terminal and positioned as detached terminal subjects” (Feenberg,
59). It is in the repositioning of people into users in a technical space that in turn reveals new
opportunity or affordances for new technical actions. This process can be applied to multiple
other technological arrangements as well, to follow the earlier example, such as digital social
networks.
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The technical decontextualization of the human being into a technical object immediately
positions them for what Feenberg describes as ‘distanced control’ or ‘operational autonomy’.
“Operational autonomy of management and administration positions them in a technical relation
to the world, safe from the consequences of their own actions… it enables them to reproduce the
conditions of their own supremacy at each iteration of the technologies they command”
(Feenberg, 53). When the process of reduction occurs, a technical object is reduced to a
manageable conceptual term in order for it to be easily controlled within the conventions of
science and technology in the next level of instrumentalization. It is important, however, at this
point, to distinguish Feenberg’s decontextualization-reduction process from the Heideggerian
concept of enframing which inspired it. Whereas Heidegger viewed the process of ‘de-worlding’
as something that could permanently alter the contextual valuing of a human being in a world
where technology has influence over nature, Feenberg views this process to be impermanent
within instrumentalization theory. “Primary instrumentalization involves decontextualization,
which shatters pre-existing natural arrangements. Of course, no decontextualization can be
absolute. The process is always conditioned by secondary instrumentalizations which offer a
partial recontextualization of the object in terms of various technical and social requirements”
(Feenberg, 57). Thus, Feenberg’s theory creates an opportunity for an escape from the trappings
of Heideggerian determinism and the inevitable destiny of human conversion into standing
reserve. Instrumentalization theory is flexible and dynamic, it enables us to conceptualize a way
out of our current technological paradigm. A paradigm where the technical code that rules the
behavior and unspoken laws of technology and men can be reevaluated and rewritten. Whereas
Heideggerian notions of technology removes human will from any possible solution to the issue
of ethical technological usage, Feenberg reinvigorates the power of human will and control by
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highlighting the continued and ever-present significance of human engineers on the process of
ethical decision-making in technological design and implementation. While technology certainly
contains transformative metaphysical and metacognitive properties, it still exists as a mechanism
of the human will. As such, it is incumbent on us as humans who are subservient to multiple
technical codes to reexamine the manner, we use technology to relate to one another, our reality,
and ourselves.
In his Critical Theory of Technology, Feenberg cites the German American philosopher
Albert Borgmann in order to establish how ‘de-worlding’ occurs in digital environments.
Borgmann states “that computer networks de-world the person, reducing human beings to a flow
of data the ‘user’ can easily control” (Feenberg, 59). This Heideggerian-esque reduction which
occurs within Feenberg’s primary level is indicative of the hierarchical relationship between the
technical object (e.g. the user/consumer) and the technical mediator. When examined via primary
instrumentalization, the interactions and content generation of users with accounts on
applications such as Facebook are reduced to meta-data for machine learning algorithms to
incorporate into their data set. At this stage in our socio-technical analysis, the manner in which
our data is represented and respected would fall to engineers and network administrators, which
still holds true generally, however machine learning algorithms have come to represent a ‘buffer’
technical mediator of sorts in social media. The issue of how machine learning algorithms are
implemented to collect, organize and classify the information they incorporate into their data
sets, not to mention the manner in which that data informs the behavior and bias of said
algorithms, are of great ethical relevance in a primary instrumentalization analysis.
Machine learning in social media infrastructure parallels instrumentalized ‘de-worlding’
when examining the manner in which Facebook user’s meta-data is mined and utilized to inform
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algorithmic functions and processes. When Facebook’s DeepFace Convolutional Neural
Network algorithm engages in facial recognition for an image or video, an individual’s very face
is reduced to a series of data points to be incorporated into another algorithmic data set. When
explained through instrumentalization theory, Feenberg explains that within this process the “two
levels are analytically distinguished. No matter how abstract the affordances identified at the
primary level, they carry social content from the secondary level in the elementary contingencies
of a particular approach to the materials” (Feenberg, 50). This description of the process of
instrumentalization demonstrates how interconnected the dual primary and secondary
instrumentalization levels are, as well as the how they represent the recursive connectivity of
ethical design implementation and society.

Secondary Instrumentalization
In secondary instrumentalization the focus lies on the social, political and cultural forces
which influence design choices. This analytical level addresses primary instrumentalization by
systematizing, technically incorporating, the reduced functions, whereby decontextualized
technical objects are combined with each other and re-embedded in the natural environment.
Technical objects can then be mediated by Actors (designers) for aesthetic and ethical
considerations (“A Critical Theory of Technology” 50). Feenberg utilizes the example of the
cutting of a tree to create lumber to further highlight the manner in which primary and secondary
instrumentalization inform each other’s socio-technical ethical constraints. “Cutting down a tree
to make lumber and building a house with it are not the primary and secondary
instrumentalizations respectively. Cutting down a tree ‘decontextualizes’ it but in line with
various technical, legal and aesthetic considerations determining what trees can become lumber
of what size and shape and are salable as such” (Feenberg, 50). Let’s expand on this, prior to a
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tree being cut down or decontextualized the loggers must address numerous social and technical
requirements imposed on them by their corporate employers and political leaders. Laws such as
the U.S. Lacey Act imposes or mediates strict limitations on what types of trees can be logged.
This mediation has been in turn informed by subsequent decontextualization processes. Illegal
logging (primary instrumentalization) informs the prohibition of logging certain species of trees
(secondary instrumentalization), which in turn informs the new decontextualization practices of
the loggers who are now performing an adjusted primary instrumentalization.
Regardless of how abstract any of the affordances which are decontextualized and
reduced at the primary level are, they still carry social content from the secondary level through
their basic technical provisions for unforeseen circumstances. Within secondary
instrumentalization, the higher-level processes of mediation and recontextualization are
implemented in order to utilize the technical affordances identified in the primary level in what
Feenberg defines as ‘disclosing’. Borrowing once again from Heidegger’s revealing, Feenberg’s
disclosing operates in much of the same way. It “is a complementary process of realization
which qualifies the original functionalization by orienting it toward a new world involving those
same objects and subjects” (Feenberg, 50). It is during the process of ‘disclosing’ that Feenberg’s
Marcusian concern with the democratizing power of technology comes into play. Marcuse’s
dialectic critical theory on technology can be utilized to understand both Feenberg’s attitude
towards the democratizing force of technology and its capability to generate technology
inscribed with the dominant values of those who control the functional processes of the technical
arrangement. While primary instrumentalization certainly does reduce people into technical
objects, it is through the constraints inherent within the technology and the various modern
cultures that utilize them that those in positions of operational autonomy are informed on the
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possibilities for ethical and aesthetic mediation prior to recontextualization. It is useful now to
return to the real-world example of the computer network, as a means of examining disclosing.
As the process of decontextualization occurs, simultaneously “a highly simplified world is
disclosed to the user which is open to the initiatives of rational consumers. They are called to
exercise choice in the world” (Feenberg, 59).
It is evident when viewed through the lens of secondary instrumentalization that
the primary generator of the technical code which governs the behavior of any machine learning
model employed on social media are the corporate actors and technical operators who oversee
Facebook’s overall data infrastructure. In ‘How Facebook Scales Machine Learning’, Jamal
Robinson demonstrates the manner in which Facebook systematizes and mediates the social
content that has been reduced by machine learning on the primary level. Robinson, an enterprise
technologist in practice, breaks down the manner in which machine learning algorithms are
scaled to leverage specific processes, such as the Facebook Newsfeed and Facial Recognition.
His deconstruction is taken from a presentation made by Yangqing Jia, Facebook’s Director of
Artificial Intelligence Infrastructure. Facebook relies on three categorical pillars when creating
and deploying machine learning models: Frameworks, Platforms, and Infrastructure.
Frameworks are needed to create, migrate and train machine learning models. Platforms are
utilized for model deployment and management. Finally, the infrastructure represents the
hardware that is needed to compute machine learning workloads and store data for future
algorithmic processes. Here Robinson helps us establish that Facebook’s approach to mediation
and systematization is directly informed by the specific software and hardware limitations that
come with maintaining and storing a world’s worth of meta-data.
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Unlike Feenberg’s conception of mediation, which implies the importance of the role of a
specific engineer in how a technological product embodies secondary instrumentalization, in
Facebook it is the interplay between the frameworks, platforms and infrastructure that
determines how this secondary process occurs. As such, if we wish to achieve a more conscious
awareness of the role of mediation in Facebook’s use of machine learning we must pay attention
to how the interplay between frameworks, platforms and infrastructure inform the ‘technical
code’, or imperative, of machine learning models. The secondary instrumentalization of
Facebook’s use of machine learning is further complicated by its use of an orchestration engine.
An orchestration engine is the technical process of running multiple applications or services to
automate a process. Facebook’s orchestration engine is FBLearner and is Facebook Inc’s
primary method of managing its’ multiple machine learning models which can be further broken
down into 3 components: the FeatureStore, FB Learner Flow, FB Learner Predictor. In
Robinson’s description, the FeatureStore is used for data manipulation and storing machine
learning features, where features represent an individual measurable property or characteristic
from observed data (Robinson 2019). This classificatory distinction between data and features in
the machine learning scaling infrastructure is key in trying to gain an appreciation for the manner
in which M.L. works with and utilizes user-information, a technical process that contains a
significant overlap with Feenberg’s notion of ‘technical code.’ FB LearnerFlow manages the
specific workflow processes required during the training of machine learning models, as well as
determining what specific hardware requests will be needed in order to deploy specific models
on Facebook. FB LearnerFlow is what enables the easy reuse of algorithms for different products
and can scale them to run thousands of processes simultaneously. The FB LearnerPredictor
component of Facebook’s orchestration engine is used to serve the models that other applications
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use to make inferences against it. In other words, it is what enables Facebook’s algorithms to
predict what a user may or may not do, through inference of the collected data and features.
When viewed from a macro-perspective, Feenberg’s notion of systematization and mediation has
become automated through Facebook’s orchestration engine. The primary role of human
engineers in the maintenance of Facebook’s instrumental systematization and mediation
processes appears in the construction of Facebook’s material Framework, use of Platforms and
Workflow Infrastructure. By automating the mediation of algorithm deployment and efficacy
machine learning algorithms have usurped humans as technical mediators and subsequently
perform the secondary instrumentalization that builds Facebook’s technical code. These kinds of
artificially mediated technical codes have proven to be harmful and pervasive throughout not
only social media, but important public service programs as well. This understanding of the
infrastructure of machine learning algorithms on social media can serve as a discursive space to
discuss the ways in which instrumentalization theory describes the ethical and technical elements
that are essential in ML implementation.
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Section 2: Machine Learning: Ubiquity and Socio-Technical Opacity

Machine learning relies on an automated process that extracts patterns from data and then
models that pattern to generate predictive decisions from data present in any available
information set. Supervised machine learning techniques automatically learn a model of the
relationship between a set of descriptive features and a target feature based on a set of historical
examples, or instances. This ‘model’ can then be used to make further predictions for new
instances (Kelleher et. al. 3). Facebook uses machine learning algorithms for classification,
ranking, and content understanding devices. According to Hazelwood, et al. in ‘Applied Machine
Learning at Facebook: A Datacenter Infrastructure Perspective’, the applications leveraged by
machine learning include but are not limited to the Facebook Newsfeed, Serving Advertisements,
Search Functions, Classifying Objects, Facial Recognition, and Language Translation. The
machine learning algorithms used by Facebook to enable these applications to function properly
include Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLP), Support Vector Machines (SVM), Gradient Boosted
Decision Trees (GBDT), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), and Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNN) (Hazelwood et al. 3).Facebook’s machine-learning artificial intelligence
‘ecosystem’, as Hazelwood describes it, can be categorized into 3 primary sections: frameworks,
platforms, and infrastructure (Hazelwood et al. 1). Hazelwood, et al., expand on Robinson’s
earlier explanation of the Facebook machine learning infrastructure in their explanation of the
Facebook ‘ecosystem’. Frameworks are needed to create, migrate and train machine learning
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models, while platforms are used for model deployment and management. Infrastructure, as
Robinson demonstrated earlier, is needed to compute workloads and store data.
Facebook was selected from among all the various social media platforms to apply
Feenberg’s instrumentalization due to its ubiquity in modern culture, in addition to its historic
significance in popularizing the brand of interactive computer-mediated technologies. What
would appear to be the inherent technical essence, to borrow from Heidegger, of social media is
the facilitation of the creation and sharing of textual, visual and audio-visual information, ideas,
career interests and multiple other forms of expression via generated communities and networks.
However, this is only true within the context of the general Facebook user. When viewed from a
macro-perspective, a second essence or technical code reveals itself in the form of meta-data
acquisition, used for storage and retrieval for machine learning inference. The existence of a dual
technical code in Facebook’s use of machine learning, parallels Feenberg’s dual-level primary
and secondary instrumentalization processes. As such, it makes sense to analyze Facebook’s
page ranking algorithm and how it is utilized to value and prioritize content for members of its
computer-mediated communities through instrumentalization theory because of its global
presence and high-level of influence on the political and social perspectives of its users.
Facebook has also found itself at the center of multiple allegations of the misuse of userinformation. In 2016 Facebook delivered the data of approximately 87 million Facebook users to
Cambridge Analytica, a British consulting firm. As J. Isaak and Mina J. Hannah declare in their
article, ‘User Data Privacy: Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and Privacy Protection’, the
delivery of “personally identifiable information (PII) of more than 87 million unsuspecting
Facebook users to Cambridge Analytica has fueled growing interest in the debate over
technology’s societal impact and risks to citizens’ privacy and well-being. It is clear that national
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government institutions demonstrably lack the ability to anticipate technology’s future impact on
the rights and duties of its citizens, much less its’ impact on the structure of society, ideological
divides, and political schisms among its citizens and the expansion of identity politics promoted
by isolated social and news gathering echo chambers” (Isaak and Hannah, 56). Using
instrumentalization theory to examine the technical code of Facebook’s use of machine learning
algorithms is useful, in order to highlight the need for a greater social awareness of digital
infrastructures and the power they hold over us when we interact with them. Unlike pre-Web 2.0
technologies which Feenberg originally described in his theorizations of instrumentalization in
the early ’90s, Facebook is in and of itself a perpetual and continuing exemplification of the
instrumentalization framework.
This form of analysis is also pertinent and relevant from another point of social exigency.
As Safiya Umoja Noble discusses in Algorithms of Oppression, “The near ubiquitous use of
algorithmically driven software, both visible and invisible to everyday people, demands a closer
inspection of what values are prioritized in such automated decision-making systems” (Noble,
16). In her description of how the Google search algorithm framework generated sexualized
content as the top results for African American Women, Noble demonstrates the manner in
which machine learning algorithms operating within Google’s search engine mediated and
compounded the generation of these racist results. This distanced control of social perceptions
vis a vis search results demonstrates the pervasive influence of machine learning across digital
spaces. “What each of these searches represents are Google’s algorithmic conceptualizations of a
variety of people and ideas. Whether looking for autosuggestions or answers to various questions
or looking for notions of what is beautiful or what a professor may look like… Google’s
dominant narratives reflect the kinds of hegemonic frameworks and notions that are often
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resisted by women and people of color” (Noble, 40). Noble and Feenberg are aligned in their
understanding that technological arrangements of all kinds must be challenged to mitigate the
creation of persecutory technological outcomes. Feenberg’s stance embodies the philosophical
and conscientious approach that individuals must engage in to liberate themselves. Whereas
Noble’s call for increased regulations of internet activity, citing the Cyber Civil Rights
Initiative’s ruling on the distribution of non-consensual pornography, represents a much more
grounded solution. Feenberg states that it is through a democratic consideration for the technical
processes of any technical arrangement that issues of oppression in those arrangements can be
addressed. In regard to how we should address issues of technological marginalization through
policy, I agree with Noble’s approach wholeheartedly. However, any policy that is created to
address the issue of technological persecution and marginalization must also be supported by
flexible theories which enable us to begin to conceptualize solutions for the unique technical
conditions present in every digital space. When viewing Noble’s analysis of Google’s use of
machine learning, instrumentalization theory suggests that machine learning algorithms
contained the recursive processes of de-worlding and disclosing of web pages for user
interaction, albeit in a manner which concretizes harmful patriarchal offline biases.
Virginia Eubank’s Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and
Punish the Poor, examines the manner in which automated decision-making technology
disproportionately impacts the lives of poor working-class households in the United States.
Eubanks begins her analysis by detailing her personal experience being red flagged by an
automated algorithm following her husband’s intensive hospitalization. According to Eubanks
testimony, she was only able to gauge what the possible cause to her family’s red flagging was
due to her educational background and the economic resources she and her partner had access to.
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Eubanks uses her personal experience to highlight that while instances of such problematic
automated red-flagging occasionally break through into the middle-class, the consequences of
this reliance on algorithms and other automated technologies impact the life possibilities of poor
working-class Americans. Eubanks supports this claim by detailing case studies exemplifying
this new form of social marginalization. A prime case comes in the form of an examination of
the manipulative political practices of Main Republican Governor Paul LePage and his use of
automated eligibility to track the purchase behaviors and patterns of TANF (Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families) recipients by tracking their EBT expenditures. LePage managed
to use the suspicious monetary activity of 0.03% of Maine TANF recipients to disparage the
remaining 99.97%, and pass legislation which required the submission of all cash receipts to
expedite State audits. “Since the Great Recession, my concern about the impacts of high-tech
tools on poor and working-class communities has increased. The skyrocketing economic
insecurity of the last decade has been accompanied by an equally rapid rise of data-based
technologies in public services: predictive algorithms, risk models, and automated eligibility
systems. Massive investments in data-driven administration of public programs are rationalized
by a call for efficiency. Technologies of poverty management are not neutral” (Eubanks, 9) Since
then, the American government has massively overhauled its use of automated technology as it
relates to the security, health insurance coverage, access to social services and beyond of low
wage working class families and minority groups.
In ‘Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Measure the Health of Populations’
Obermeyer et. al. found evidence of racial bias in an algorithm that was being used to measure
the health of populations, as well as their eligibility for insurance in the United Kingdom. The
algorithm would make it so that Black patients assigned the same level of risk would be
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classified as sicker than White patients. Obermeyer et. al concluded that algorithmic bias reduced
the number of Black patients identified for extra care by more than half. The reason for this bias
was due to the algorithm’s use of low health costs as a proxy for health needs, in short it
conflated health costs with health needs. As a result, less money was spent on Black patients who
had the same level of need, and the algorithm falsely concluded that Black patients were
healthier than equally sick White patients. (Obermeyer et. al., 421).
Each of these case studies highlights the global reach of machine learning algorithms, as
well as the devastating real-world impacts of their usage. The general theme of this historical
turn towards machine learning automation, is that companies and government agencies will
always opt for the most expedient technical solution for longstanding social problems. In the
words ascribed to George Santayana, “those who do not learn history are often doomed to repeat
it.” In the case of machine learning, perhaps not so much a lesson unlearned as a lesson not
heeded. Deferment to expedient technical solutions versus ethical ones, reveals yet another need
for a reorientation of our relationship to automation and exponential innovation.

The Functional Ethic of Machine Learning Algorithms
Arlindo Oliveira in the Digital Mind provides a simplified description of Machine
Learning as it relates to artificial intelligence which is helpful in contextualizing ML models as
inherently neutral technology in regard to their function. According to Oliveira, the
quintessential problem of machine learning consists, in its most simplified form, of inferring
general rules or behaviors from a number of specific concrete experiences. This general process
is referred to as inductive learning. Inductive learning is performed by learning a general rule
from a set of labeled instances. Oliveira provides multiple practical examples and analogies to
describe different ML models, such as GBDT and K-Nearest Neighbor, methodologically
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referred to as similarity-based learning. Oliveira cites David Hume, and his critique of inductionbased learning in order to critique the inference methods of machine learning models that are
currently being deployed in various industries, including social media. Hume points out that
induction from past experience cannot provide guaranteed results, as our ability to learn from
experience exists only because there is some regularity in the data that we are able to explore.
Oliveira refers to this inductive bias as the generator of the variety of different algorithmic
machine learning models we see today. Oliveira goes on to demonstrate that all learning
algorithms have the same inherent outcomes when their respective performances are averaged
across all possible problems in a given domain. Commonly referred to as the No Free Lunch
Theorem, it describes the fact that all learning algorithms are equally good if a preference for a
specific learning bias can’t be established. When incorporating the No Free Lunch Theorem into
a rhetorical analysis of the functional ethics of machine learning algorithms one comes to
understand that no one model is more ethical or unethical in its implementation than another. As
such, the inherent functional ethic of machine learning algorithms when employed in public
production environments is one of general neutrality. This perceived neutral functional ethic in
turn lends itself to obfuscating secondary ad hoc and corporate technical ethics which motivate
their purposes, and also highlights the fact that any and all algorithms are susceptible to a
dominating technical code which holds the potential to perpetuate obfuscation indefinitely. As
we established in the previous sections, the technical code that comes to dominate the neutral
function of machine learning comes in the form of the digital infrastructure which models are
deployed into.
Safiya Umoja Noble demonstrates how machine learning directs social media in
problematic ways when she describes the manner in which search results, managed and produced
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by machine-learning algorithms have the tendency of generating disparaging and racially
insensitive results. When examining Noble’s critique of Google within the context of the No
Free Lunch Theorem we come to realize that while machine learning was certainly the vehicle
by which racist and sexually explicit results were generated, one cannot ascribe the originating
power of the technical code to it. While Noble describes this form of technological social
marginalization within the context of identity and social inclusion, it hits at the core of what
Feenberg has set out to describe and correct in his creation of the instrumentalization (primary
and secondary) analytical heuristics. The lack of consideration for the social impact of the
technological design and implementation of automated technologies, highlights the need for
further consideration of the social and dialectic variables that are at play when technical design
decisions are being made (secondary instrumentalization). Noble’s analysis highlights what can
go wrong when decisions at the secondary level of technological instrumentalization impact the
reality of its users at the primary level (Noble 64). Similarly, in ‘Racist in the Machine’, cyber
security specialist Megan Garcia highlights the need for companies and governments to “pay
attention to the unconscious and institutional biases that seep into their algorithms” (Garcia 115).
Garcia notes that distorted data can skew results in web searches, home loan decisions, or photo
recognition software. This analysis of machine learning challenges Oliveira’s claims of total
technological neutrality, as well as our conceptions of what it means for digital technology to
work ‘well’. Machine learning works in the sense that it gets any singular job done, but an
algorithm has no sense of social liberty or cultural history. It does not care if a minority family
can’t make EBT withdrawals following a red flagging. An algorithm has no country, nor does it
hold national interests or even domestic ones. It does not care if a politician disseminates lies and
falsehoods so as to cling onto power.
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In addition to various accounts of algorithmic design misuse levied against machine
learning, DeepFake facial modification algorithms being a prime example, the controversy
surrounding machine learning’s use also extends to targeted advertisements and the ethics of
corporate data mining. When informed by Noble’s social analysis and the No Free Lunch
Theorem, Feenberg’s instrumentalization theory suggests that machine learning algorithms focus
the recursive and simultaneous processes of de-worlding and disclosing within the web pages
they are employed and meta data inscriptions from user-generated content. This can occur in a
manner which can concretize harmful patriarchal offline biases when socio-technical design
concerns are not addressed. In other words, it is the algorithmic bias of the machine learning
model which informs the technical and ethical constraints of the production environment on the
secondary level of instrumentalization. When the algorithmic bias of a particular machine
learning algorithm is informed by poor data, the implications related to its usage when it is
deployed into a production environment are directly tied to the specific engineers and designers
who designed the digital infrastructure in which it was deployed. As explained in the previous
section, the methodology for data acquisition and implementation stems from the infrastructure
which guides and maintains the process of data storage, use and inference. When viewed via
instrumentalization theory, questions pertaining to the manner in which executive decisions
related to machine learning algorithms ability to mine user data reveal the manner in which
technical problems are relegated to corporate control and ethical mediation. As such giving more
attention to the ethical mediation, or lack thereof, of the impact of the algorithmic bias of
machine learning algorithms on the data of Facebook users, as well as the countless other public
services leveraged by machine learning, must become a central concern of American Science and
Technology policy going forward.
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The Socio-Technical Opacity of Machine Learning in Social Media and the Obfuscation of
Algorithmic Bias
The last few sections have examined the manner in which algorithmic processes and the
infrastructure that enable their deployment to constitute a socio-technical opacity, but the
question obviously arises, so what? Surely, human beings have successfully engaged with blackboxed technology in the past without severe social repercussions. This is true to an extent, but it
would be a grave mistake to compare present digital technologies to other technological
innovations of the 20th century, like the telephone or radio. With those technologies, the technical
code is more or less easily discerned in the immediacy of the technical product, in the case of the
phone and radio it is the successful audio transmission of a voice from one location to another.
However, the opacity present in machine learning masks its’ dual technical codes, one informed
by the users it interacts with and assists, and the other by its creators and the infrastructure it
exists in. Opacity creates the illusion of technological neutrality and fogs human understanding
of the influence technology has on the development of how they interact with the world. In a
world that is becoming increasingly constituted by automated technologies, to lack an
appropriate understanding of their functions is akin to lacking basic awareness of your own
human rights. The persistence of socio-technical opacity in relation to automated technologies,
machine learning algorithms in particular, erodes and effaces the democratic potential and
promise of new digital technologies.
While Noble and Garcia establish an exigency for the creation of a more clear-cut
discourse on machine learning models in social media, Dr. Jenna Burrell introduces us to the
concept of opacity in machine learning implementation. Machine learning algorithms “are
opaque in the sense that if one is a recipient of the output of the algorithm (the classification
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decision), rarely does one have any concrete sense of how or why a particular classification has
been arrived at from inputs. Additionally, the inputs themselves may be entirely unknown or
known only partially. What are the reasons for this state of not knowing? Is it because the
algorithm is proprietary? Because it is complex or highly technical? Or are there perhaps, other
reasons?” (Burell, 1). Burrell distinguishes between three different forms of socio-technical
opacity present in machine learning algorithm models across all technological industries and
potential implementations. The first form of opacity relates to opacity as intentional corporate or
state secrecy, particularly when they engage in the use of algorithms for ranking, recommending,
trending, and filtering, which is often used to secure attention from the public. The second form
of opacity that Burrell deconstructs is opacity as technical illiteracy, which stems from the fact
that understanding code and the design of algorithms is a specialized skill. This knowledge
continues to remain out of reach of the majority of the population. Code used in programming
languages, such as Python, have a particular syntax and language that must be learned. These
languages follow logic-based rules that require exactness in spelling, grammar, and sequencing
for an algorithm to function properly. According to Burrell “good code does double-duty. It must
be interpretable by humans (the original programmer or someone adding to or maintaining the
code) as well as by the computational device. Writing for the computational device demands a
special exactness, formality, and completeness that communication via human languages does
not” (Burrell 4). The third and final form of opacity reflects opacity as the way algorithms
operate at the scale of their application. Burrell argues that there are particular “challenges of
scale and complexity that are distinctive to machine learning algorithms” (Burrell 5).
As Burrell notes in her article, opacity is tied not only to the total number of lines or
pages of code but to other material conditions, such as the number of team members on the

30

engineering team and the number of interlinkages between modules or sub-routines. (Burrell 4).
Burrell observes that this poses further challenges to both scholars and industry professionals
who wish to understand what exactly occurs when machine learning algorithms are deployed in
various online services. According to Burrell, “though a machine learning algorithm can be
implemented simply in such a way that its logic is almost fully comprehensible, in practice, such
an instance is unlikely to be particularly useful. M.L. models that prove useful (specifically, in
terms of the ‘accuracy’ of classification) possess a degree of unavoidable complexity” (Burrell
5). Burrell points out that it is the heterogenous characteristics of the data (features) which adds
complexity to the code. The interplay between large data sets and the code in the mechanism of
the algorithm is ultimately what yields this analytical complexity (which compounds opacity).
Burrell goes on to provide examples to better understand this complexity and provides
suggestions for overcoming the barriers to opacity by means of visualizing neural networks, in
addition to inspecting the opacity of spam filtering to examine classificatory discrimination.
Evaluating the manner in which the socio-technical opacity of machine learning algorithms in
social media constrains social processes and technological understanding requires an
understanding of the material infrastructure that designers and engineers at companies like
Facebook Inc., are themselves constrained by when producing machine learning algorithms.
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Section 3: An Instrumentalized Analysis of Machine Learning & the Need for a Heightened
Socio-Technical Awareness in Science and Technology Policy

We would like to believe that social media is a perfectly neutral networking tool to
maintain communication with our friends, loved ones and the world at large, however, scholars
from the Frankfurt School and theorists inspired by them, like Feenberg, would disagree as to the
existence of a truly neutral technological arrangement. “Neutrality generally refers to the
indifference of a specific means to the range of possible ends it can serve … There is no such
thing as technology as such. Today we employ this specific technology with limitations that are
due not only to the state of our knowledge but also to the power structures that bias this
knowledge and its applications. This really existing contemporary technology favors specific
ends and obstructs others” (Feenberg, 182). According to Lars Backstrom, the Engineering
Manager for NewsFeed Ranking at Facebook, there are “as many as 100,000 individual weights
that produce NewsFeed. The three original EdgeRank elements- Affinity, Weight, Time Decayare still factors in NewsFeed ranking, but other things are equally important” (McGee, 2014).
Outside of the standard Affinity, Weight and Time Decay weight factors, the new algorithm also
considers a user’s relationship settings, post types, spam reporting, network exploration, device
considerations, and story bumping.
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Facebook Inc.’s Technical Code
Facebook has experienced multiple iterations of its page ranking algorithm but for the
purposes of this analysis shall be limited to EdgeRank and its current machine learning based
algorithm. The earlier iteration, EdgeRank, collected, organized, and ranked undiscovered
content based on three elements: affinity (the proximity of content to the technical user), weight
(the action a user took when interacting with content) and time decay (which values newer
content over pre-existing content). “Every item that shows up on the NewsFeed is considered an
object. If you have an object in the NewsFeed (say a status update), whenever another user
interacts with that object, they are creating an edge, which includes actions like tags and
comments” (Kincaid, 2010). When each edge factor was multiplied by the other, the resulting
value represented the contents’ relevancy score represented algorithmically as ∑µwd. Affinity,
weight, and decay were all presented to the user via their content interface. It is in this way that
the EdgeRank algorithm incorporates Feenberg’s primary and secondary instrumentalizations
simultaneously, much like the tree being cut for wood the algorithmically generated content on
the NewsFeed has already been mediated for worth. When a user creates an edge factor through
a de-worlding interaction (primary) the content is at the same time undergoing a new disclosing
when the EdgeRank algorithm recalculates the content’s relevancy score (secondary).
This speaks to the presence of Facebook’s public facing technical code, where machine
learning algorithms are utilized to enhance the user’s experience on social media, through
improvements in user to user and user to content interactions. However, as we’ve already
established, Facebook’s use of machine learning models underscores a second technical code. A
technical code that is informed by Facebook’s artificial intelligence infrastructure. Burrell’s
analysis and explanation of opacity in machine learning model deployment hits at the essence of
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this secondary technical code. A technical code that is supported by an infrastructure designed to
harvest terabytes of personally identifiable information and meta-data for process enhancement
and vendor access to user data. However, providing ease of access to our personal information
for outside-third parties is merely an extremely powerful side-effect of machine learning’s true
technical code. When examined through instrumentalization theory, the functional purpose of
machine learning is obfuscated by the technical code that situates the Facebook user as a
confused and ignorant resource. Facebook’s second code does not assist socio-technical opacity,
rather it is quite literally the essential embodiment of opacity. Facebook relies on an incredibly
opaque understanding of the function of machine learning models inputs and outputs to secure
their control of all socialization processes on the network. As Burrell notes, the primary
motivation behind this technical code’s valuing of opacity stems from a combination of technical
opacity related to the high calculus of machine learning, in addition to the opacity generated by
scaling ML models to Facebook’s massive infrastructure. This is not to say that Facebook does
not have a responsibility to attempt to clear this opacity, rather that it highlights an intense
vulnerability that vendors of ill-intent can manipulate for their own political and monetary gain.
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What Ethical Concerns Surrounding Machine Learning Implementation Should American
Science and Technology Policy Consider?

Because of its’ capacity to highlight both the problematic and positive ethics of
technology, I believe Feenberg’s theory of instrumentalization can serve as the theoretical
foundation for future considerations for Science and Technology policy related to machine
learning and other ubiquitous socialization technologies with socio-reductive characteristics.
More than 3 years after H.R. 5051, the OPEN Government Data Act, attempted to create a means
to publish all non-federally restricted data in an open source format in order to produce a
standardized use of big data for both federal and public use, we have now entered an age where
private companies are able to dictate the rules of information management and metadata
commodification through machine learning. Since the 2016 American Presidential election,
which saw one of the most blatant violations of consumer privacy in internet history when the
personally identifiable information of 87 million Facebook users was made available to
Cambridge Analytica, not to mention the use of Facebook’s vulnerable infrastructure by Russian
hackers to disseminate political and social falsehoods, questions about the integrity of America’s
digital society remain unanswered. While Cambridge Analytica was dissolved in 2018 for
allegations of bribery and sexual “honey-potting” on the behalf of their clients, looking at
Facebook today, it is not clear if attempts made by Mark Zuckerberg or his Director of Artificial
Intelligence have solved the issue of information privacy. After all, Facebook does not sell
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personal information but rather makes our personal information available to outside vendors. If
Facebook’s automated digital infrastructure provides machine learning with its opaque technical
code, then the rules of ethical machine learning use falls to the vendors who are on the receiving
end of Facebook’s ML driven meta-data acquisitions. This reliance on the supposed ethics of
third-party vendors is deeply troubling.
In his examination of Brad Parscale, the digital director for President Donald Trump’s
2020 re-election campaign, McKay Coppins of the Atlantic sees no evidence of an ethical
approach to targeted use of machine learning. Parscale Media, of which Parscale is the founder,
was first noticed by the Trump Organization in 2011. Parscale continued working for the Trump
Organization before he started work on the 2016 presidential campaign. Parscale “seemed to
have no reservations about the kind of campaign Trump wanted to run. The race-baiting, the
immigrant-bashing, the truth-bending- none of it seemed to bother Parscale. While some
Republicans wrung their hands over Trump’s inflammatory messages, Parscale came up with
ideas to more effectively disseminate them.” (Coppins). During the general election Parscale’s
team used Google and Facebook to spread inexpensive ads fomenting notions of the threat of
radical Islamic terrorists and Hillary Clinton’s criminality. Parscale plans to continue
implementing this approach to Trump’s 2020 digital ad campaign, and Facebook’s technical
code of opacity will assist him and his team in doing just that. McKay refers to this opaque
shadowy interaction with machine learning on the behalf of political advertisers and vendors as a
disinformation architecture. The disinformation architecture of the Trump campaign, and those
like it, benefits directly from public misunderstanding of the manner in which their personal data
is used for targeted advertisement.
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This problem also extends internationally. McKay cites Peter Pomerantsev’s book This is
Not Propaganda and the case of ‘P’, a Filipino political consultant who utilized targeted
advertising to successfully test a disturbing social experiment. As a student in college, ‘P’
learned of the ‘Little Albert’ experiment, where a child was psychologically conditioned to fear
furry animals after exposing him to a lab rat following a loud noise. ‘P’ took inspiration from
‘Little Albert’ and created multiple Facebook groups under the pretense of providing a space for
Filipinos to talk about daily events in their communities. However, after the group gathered
roughly 100,000 members ‘P’ “began posting local crime stories and instructed his employees to
leave comments falsely tying the grisly headlines to drug cartels. The pages lit up with frightened
chatter. Rumors swirled; conspiracy theories metastasized. To many, all crimes became drug
crimes” (Coppins). Little did the members of these Facebook groups know that ‘P’ had designed
these groups to boost the popularity of then-aspiring presidential candidate, Rodrigo Duterte
whose rise to international power was launched by a stern promise to eliminate drug cartels.
Since 2016 Duterte’s Presidency has been characterized by hundreds of extrajudicial killings,
many of the victims having been drug addicts with no connection to organized crime. This is one
of the more extreme examples of how a lack of conscientious awareness of the pervasive
influence that an automated digital space has on human behavior effaces not only our social
conceptions of truth but our ability to form consensus. These cases of third parties misusing
algorithmic targeting degrades our ability to participate effectively in democracy, by extension
technical opacity aids in this erosion. From all appearances, and via our analysis of Facebook’s
general machine learning infrastructure using instrumentalization theory it is clear that it is still
just as vulnerable to manipulation by unethical third-party mediators as it was in 2016. This lack
of forward momentum in corporate and institutional accountability in regard to machine learning
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model implementation on social media presents the need for two primary points of public policy
to address this concern. Namely, the development of a national regulatory body for machine
learning model implementation on social media and other digital service platforms as well as the
creation of education programs designed around the understanding and use of coding.
Regulation requires the hard work of examining the technical code of newly emerging
machine learning infrastructures and evaluating them through national standardized training and
inference processes with diverse sample data sets representing features from meta-data collected
from minority groups, different political organizations, and verified and unverified news. This is
an adaptation of an earlier attempt by federal agencies to do just this work in other industries. In
2019 the U.S. Food & Drug Administration proposed a regulatory framework for modifications
to artificial intelligence software as a medical device [SaMD]. The FDA proposal outlines
several guidelines for standardizing the regulation of machine learning algorithms prior to their
public implementation. “The FDA’s proposed TPLC [Total Product Life Cycle] approach is
based on the following general principles that balance the benefits and risks, and provide access
to safe and effective AI/ML-based SaMD: 1. Establish clear expectations on quality systems and
good ML practices; 2. Conduct premarket review for those SaMD that require premarket
submission to demonstrate reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness and establish clear
expectations for manufacturers of AI/ML-based SaMD to continually manage patient risks
throughout the lifecycle; 3. Expect manufacturers to monitor the AI/ML device and incorporate a
risk management approach and other approaches outlined in ‘Deciding When to Submit a 510(k)
for a Software Change to an Existing Device’ Guidance18 in development, validation, and
execution of the algorithm changes (SaMD Pre-Specifications and Algorithm Change Protocol);
4. Enable increased transparency to users and FDA using postmarket real-world performance
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reporting for maintaining continued assurance of safety and effectiveness” (Proposed Regulatory
Framework for Modifications to Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning [AI/ML]-Based
Software as a Medical Device [SaMD]). This white paper proposal is a promising step in a
potential right direction. It represents a genuine willingness from the Federal government to
engage with the prospect of seriously tackling the issue of algorithmic regulation in important
service sectors.
The FDA’s approach to machine learning regulation provides scholars and policy makers
interested in expanding such regulation into a broader American Science and Technology policy
related to the use of automated targeting technologies a codified approach to a non-invasive
outcome-based regulatory process. The Food & Drug Administration’s regulatory policy also
emphasizes reconfiguring algorithms that are currently deployed in public services, by adjusting
a model’s approach to data management and retraining it to provide greater transparency for
users, in this case health service providers and patients. Here the FDA’s regulatory proposal
provides some promise of a possible solution to the perpetuation of disinformation
infrastructures compounded by socio-technical opacity. Regulation should and must strive for
transparency and work to limit the creation of opaque notions of machine learning model
implementation and scaling.
A national regulatory body for machine learning algorithm models designed for social
media would have to work to ensure that machine learning processes that are responsible for
opaque understandings of the influence of third-party advertisers and organizations, are more
transparent for users. Taking more inspiration from the FDA’s approach to the regulation of
machine learning in software for medical devices, possible best practices for a general regulatory
body should include (1) relevance of available data for user to user and user to content
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interaction, (2) data acquired in a consistent, relevant manner, and generalizable manner that
aligns with the algorithms intended use and modification plans, (3) an appropriate separation
between training, tuning, and test data sets and (4) an increased emphasis on transparency of
the output of the algorithm aimed at social media users.
However, the creation of a national regulatory body for the regulation of machine
learning algorithm model usage in social media applications is not enough to achieve the desired
goal of cultivating a heightened social consciousness about the influence of the technical codes
of third-party disinformation infrastructures. Machine learning regulation must be supported by
educational initiatives designed around providing children and young adults a clear
understanding of the transformative social power of automated technologies and algorithms.
Fortunately, there are newly emerging examples of potential curricular approaches on cultivating
a general awareness of machine learning and other automated technologies. Blakely H. Payne, a
doctoral candidate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has developed a curriculum to
teach children about integral concepts such as algorithmic bias and deep learning. “She tested the
week-and-a-half long program with about 225 fifth-through-eigth grade students at David E.
Williams Middle School in Coraopolis, PA outside Pittsburgh. […] Payne developed the course
of study with input from computer science teachers and researchers at the Harvard Graduate
School of Education. Her unplugged curriculum mainly uses pen, paper and craft supplies so that
teachers can adapt it for their classrooms, regardless of budget or technological know-how. Each
45-minute lesson typically includes a short lecture and demonstration, followed by a group
activity and open-ended discussion” (Ma). The learning outcomes of Payne’s experimental
course encourage students to: “(1) understand the basic mechanics of artificial intelligence
systems, (2) understand that all technical systems are socio-technical systems and that these
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systems are not neutral sources information, but instead serve political agendas, (3) recognize
that there are many stakeholders in a given socio-technical system and that the system can affect
these stakeholders differentially, (4) apply both technical understanding of AI and knowledge of
stakeholders in order to determine a just goal for a socio-technical system, (5) consider the
impact of technology on the world” (Payne). The learning outcomes for Payne’s ‘Ethics for
Artificial Intelligence Curriculum for Middle Schooler’s’ address the ontological concerns of
machine learning algorithms revealed through Feenberg’s instrumentalization theory. In
particular, the development of an awareness of social media’s reliance on a technical code based
in socio-technical opacity. While certain aspects of socio-technical opacity will always exist,
such as the opacity related to scaling algorithms for global service platforms, an educational
effort is essential in order to address the social impacts of automated technology from the
ground-up.
These policy considerations are motivated by rising instances of machine learning misuse
via harmful algorithmic bias not only in the social media industry, but health, banking and
national security. This dual-policy approach, based on establishing a firm regulatory system for
machine learning in addition to a new educational curriculum to inform the public on the dangers
of opacity, is the most practical and responsible means of reclaiming the democratic potential of
digital spaces and automated technologies. If we are to follow the advice of Andrew Feenberg,
and truly aim for the true democratization of technology, then we must engage in the hard and
continuous work of aligning policy with the values we espouse in the classroom. Social media’s
digital infrastructure should not become a dark reflection of humanity’s baser instincts and
motivations. When viewed through the lens of Feenberg’s instrumentalization theory we see
spaces where the obfuscating power of machine learning’s technical code can be challenged and
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possibly rectified. It is essential that social scientists, scholars in Science and Technology
Studies, educators and politicians address this force that threatens to obfuscate our understanding
of current events, the plight of minority populations, and the inscription of social prejudice. As
Feenberg writes, “a social account of the essence of technology enlarges democratic concerns to
encompass the technical dimension of our lives. It offers an alternative to both the ongoing
celebration of technology triumphant and the gloomy Heideggerian prediction of technocultural
disaster” (Feenberg, 17). If we truly wish to preserve the integrity of the democratic experiment,
then we must also be concerned with the continued and perpetual democratization of technology
through progressive policy and education initiatives.
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